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ABSTRACT 
 
This article examines the impact of regional financial arrangements (RFAs) on the global liquidity 
regime. It argues that the design of RFAs could potentially alter the global regime, whether by 
strengthening it and making it more coherent or by decentering the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and destabilizing it. To determine possible outcomes, this analysis deploys a ‘middle-up’ 
approach that focuses on the institutional design of these RFAs. It first draws on the rational design 
of institutions framework to identify the internal characteristics of RFAs that are most relevant to 
their capabilities and capacities. It then applies these insights to RFAs’ interactions with the IMF, 
building on Aggarwal’s (1998) conception of ‘nested’ versus ‘parallel’ institutions, to create an 
analytical lens through which to assess the nature and sustainability of nested linkages. Through 
an analysis of the Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) and the Latin American 
Reserve Fund (FLAR), the article demonstrates the usefulness of this lens. It concludes by 
considering three circumstances in which fault lines created by these RFAs’ institutional design 
could be activated, permitting an institution to ‘leave the nest’, including changing intentions of 
principals, creation of parallel capabilities and facilities, and failure of the global regime to address 
regional needs in a crisis.  
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builds upon previous work funded by UNCTAD and the Global Economic Governance Initiative at the 
Global Development Policy Center at Boston University. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
For decades, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) has been the subject of vigorous debate in 
international political economy, with scholars minutely analysing its governance and its role in 
managing currency crises and balance of payments difficulties (Ban, 2015; Chwieroth, 2009; 
Gallagher and Tian, 2017; Kentikelenis et al., 2016; Woods, 2006). Given the central role assigned 
to the IMF in managing and preventing crises, it is not surprising that many studies of the global 
governance of balance of payments have typically focused on the IMF and its relations with major 
shareholders and borrowers.  
 
The rise of regional financial arrangements (RFAs) in diverse settings including Latin America, 
East Asia, the European Union, the Arab sphere, and now Brazil, Russia, India, China and South 
Africa (the BRICS countries), re-opens the question of what constitutes the global financial safety 
net (GFSN). These arrangements vary considerably in terms of size, scope, capabilities, internal 
governance and relationship with the IMF. Also, many are new and untested. All this has led to 
considerable confusion as to whether they are ushering in a new global system, supplementing the 
existing system, or operating in an uneasy negotiating space that might introduce new uncertainties 
into the already tricky realm of managing currency crises. 
 
As we describe below, several streams of literature have begun to address the impact of RFAs. 
Much of the debate has been over intentionality — do RFAs desire or intend to replace IMF 
functions within their region, based either on alternative economic ideas or out of suspicion of an 
organization that is still preponderantly managed by the developed economies of North America 
and Europe? (Kawai, 2015; Lee, 2008). Others have approached the issue from a functionalist 
perspective, calling for better coordination between RFAs, the IMF and regional governments. 
(Grabel, 2018; Henning, 2017; Ocampo, 2017; UNCTAD, 2015; Volz, 2016). These are important 
debates. However, we argue in this article that both the bottom-up (country- or region-based 
intentions) and top-down (systemic) approaches to understanding RFAs are insufficient to 
understand their actual and potential impact on global economic governance and the global 
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economy. We instead pursue a ‘middle-up’ approach that focuses on the systemic effects of the 
institutional design of RFAs. 
 
Our unit of analysis in this project is the RFAs themselves, which display a variety of institutional 
features. All RFAs must serve multiple purposes; therefore, participating states must accept 
compromises across various goals and preferences, making each RFA a particular political story. 
Importantly, the design of RFAs is intentional, and so states put considerable thought, effort and 
resources into ensuring that these institutions are designed in a way that ‘works’. Thus, RFAs are 
prime candidates for analysis through the lens of the rational institutional design literature (RDI). 
We break our analysis into two components — internal characteristics (drawing heavily on the 
literature that has grown out of Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal (2001)) and external relations (using 
Aggarwal’s (1998) typology of institutional compatibility and of ‘nested’ versus ‘parallel’ 
institutions). We focus our analysis on the design and operations of two prominent RFAs, the 
Fondo Latinamericano de Reservas (FLAR) — Latin American Reserve Fund — and the Chiang 
Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM), while also drawing on the experience of other regions.  
 
We argue that the ways in which RFAs are designed in terms of key attributes of the RDI 
framework — membership, scope, centralization, control and flexibility — determine their effect 
on the global system. While very different from each other in many relevant respects, both the 
FLAR and CMIM have organizational characteristics that have systemic effects, regardless of the 
intentions of participating states at any given point in time. The FLAR, for example, has largely 
displaced the IMF in regional balance of payments lending for its member countries, on the basis 
of disbursed loans. Further, if FLAR members were to follow one of several feasible options for 
expanding the fund’s size, the role of the IMF in the region would be further diminished. The 
CMIM is large but untested, and at the moment lacks the institutional capabilities and breadth of 
operations of the FLAR. It is, moreover, currently designed as a status quo organization that 
supports the IMF-led global system. However, the last decade has seen concerted efforts to 
improve its size, scope and capabilities to support regional economies; while CMIM is still firmly 
in a position that is supportive of the global system, we argue that these efforts raise the likelihood 
of divergence and even schism.  
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Looking globally, we argue that the growing presence and capabilities of RFAs present the global 
system with a paradox. On the one hand, larger and more capable RFAs clearly improve the 
functionality of the existing system. They are in many cases explicitly and institutionally nested in 
the global system; even when that is not formally the case, as with the FLAR, their development 
parallels similar developments in the IMF and other RFAs regarding ideas and tools for managing 
crises. On the other hand — and this is our crucial point — the growing size, scope and capability 
of RFAs architecturally de-centre the IMF, creating fault lines along which future disagreements 
may lead to divergence and even schism. This new global system may currently operate as a more 
or less hierarchical system, mirroring Katzenstein’s (2005) theorization of a world of regions, but 
it also creates opportunities for challenges to the global order. While making the global financial 
order more robust in terms of tools and overall capabilities, the emergence and expansion of RFAs 
also make this apparently improved global financial safety net much more vulnerable to 
idiosyncratic changes, whether in the form of great power competition, miscalculation, or even 
(our current candidate for most likely threat to the global system) a Trumpian act of myopic 
selfishness.  
 
The article proceeds as follows. We begin by surveying the emerging literature on RFAs. We 
delineate the main strands of theorizing and analysis, and identify the gap in the existing literature 
between mid-range organizational analysis and analysis of systemic effects. Next, we draw on the 
rational institutional design literature to identify the key organizational features that affect RFAs’ 
capabilities and to develop a framework that relates organizational capability to the global system 
in which they are currently nested. We then turn to an empirical analysis of the FLAR and CMIM 
in which we demonstrate their growing capabilities, their capacity for further expansion of 
capabilities and the fault lines thus created. We close by considering the implications for both the 
global system and for the prospects of RFAs in general. 
 
This article draws from extensive fieldwork conducted by both authors during 2016 and 2017. The 
authors conducted semi-structured interviews in China, Colombia, Ecuador, Japan, Singapore, and 
South Africa with government officials and representatives from both the FLAR and CMIM. 
Interview subjects included central bank officials in these countries, representatives from 
ministries of finance, officials at the FLAR, and officials at the AMRO. In addition, the authors 
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participated in official meetings sponsored by the United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR), and the South 
African Institute of International Affairs (SAAIA).  
 
 
APPROACHES TO REGIONAL FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS 
 
The rise of RFAs raises important questions about whether they may replace IMF functions within 
their region, and the implications of the RFAs for global governance. While some scholars are 
inclined to focus on the United States (US), the US Federal Reserve, and the enduring role of the 
US dollar (e.g., Drezner, 2014; Helleiner, 2014), most scholars have focused on two interrelated 
debates about the extent and effect of IMF reforms and the implications of RFAs. Starting with 
IMF reforms and the extent to which they are responsive to criticism of the IMF, scholars have 
taken either bottom-up or top-down approaches. The nature of these changes is of crucial 
importance in understanding relationships between RFAs and the IMF, as they determine RFAs 
principals’ satisfaction with those relationships and thus their incentive to shift from nested to 
parallel relations.   
 
Bottom-up approaches to understanding post-crisis changes to IMF policy and practices have 
described a variety of efforts to respond to the concerns of emerging economies. Chwieroth (2014) 
specifically argues the IMF has layered new policies on capital inflow controls onto older 
positions, but that the cumulative impact of incremental changes has been transformative. 
Gallagher and Ocampo (2013) also welcome the IMF’s ‘new institutional’ view on capital 
controls, while cautioning that ‘it remains wedded to eventual financial liberalisation’ (ibid.: 10). 
All things being equal, the IMF effort to learn from experience and to address concerns raised by 
emerging markets over its previous practices should reduce demand for establishing or enhancing 
RFAs in favor of strengthening existing alternative institutions. However, the growth of RFAs 
continues unabated. Recent scholarship on the IMF provides a possible causal logic for the 
continuing progress on RFAs despite IMF reforms. Ban and Gallagher (2014) find that while ‘new 
ideas and evidence definitely found their way into IMF decision making, . . . the nature of the 
institution and the powerful interests that control its governing structure’ (Ban and Gallagher, 2014 
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131) tempered the scale of reform. Kentikelenis et al (2016) support this claim, arguing that 
‘multiple layers of ceremonial reforms have been designed to obscure the actual practice of 
adjustment programmes (ibid.: 543), leading to inconsistent integration of reforms into lending 
practices. Vernengo and Ford (2014: 1194) make a similar critique, arguing that ‘the Fund 
continues to be the mechanism through which creditor countries enforce contractionary policy on 
indebted countries’.  
 
Top-down approaches also find that IMF reforms for broader governance and policy reform have 
had marginal impact. Vestergaard and Wade (2015) find that IMF reforms do little to improve the 
equitability of decision-making power between the global South and global North — although 
‘developed countries gained voting share relative to GDP share between 2009 and 2014 … some 
countries have six times or more the votes relative to GDP of others’ (ibid.: 1). The incremental 
impact of those changes underscores the limited scope of IMF reform, potentially highlighting 
why RFAs have emerged at an ever-accelerating rate since the great financial crisis.  
 
Turning from demand for RFAs, a second stream of the RFA literature addresses whether or not 
they challenge or supplement the existing global governance system. The debate breaks down into 
what we term the ‘functional supplementalist’ and ‘challenger’ camps. Scholars in the functional 
supplementalist camp tend to take a top-down approach to the study of the RFAs and ask similar 
questions as Vestergaard and Wade: how can the existing global governance system be improved?. 
Henning (2016) argues the global liquidity safety net can be improved and further integrated. 
Henning and Walter (2016) argue that existing, developed country multilateral institutions should 
work to improve the level of accommodation … and [propose some] active measures are required 
to achieve this’ (ibid.: 22), while conceding that improvements to global financial governance 
system could be hindered by divergent interests between states. Likewise, Ocampo (2017) argues 
that the financial architecture for global liquidity should be conceived as IMF-led, with the IMF 
‘as the apex of a network of regional reserve funds rather than a mere global fund’ (ibid.: 200). 
 
Other functional supplementalists focus on the potential benefits of the developing multilevel 
international financial architecture, arguing that it is more balanced than the old IMF-centred 
system. They point to ‘a network of global, regional, and subregional institutions’ (Ocampo and 
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Titleman, 2009: 249) that can act as a first line of defence and supplement the IMF. That said, Fritz 
and Mühlich (2014) identify gaps in the network of regional financial institution that could imperil 
financial stability. While functional supplementalist accounts raise important concerns about 
coordination within an enhanced and more integrated financial architecture, they tend to take the 
existing configurations of RFAs as static. They thus discount the importance of the accumulation 
of gradual institutional changes and the ways in which RFAs’ design features may affect broader 
financial governance. In contrast, we argue that it is important to consider not only how the Bretton 
Woods order incorporates RFAs, but also the ways in which RFAs themselves affect the system 
of global governance. 
 
Some scholars present the emergence of RFAs as a challenge driven by economies from the global 
south. Grabel (2015) argues that global governance can be best understood ‘via the concept of 
“productive incoherence” which is apparent in a denser, multilayered development financial 
architecture’ (ibid.: 388). While the details of the design of RFAs and the nuances of the 
institutions as compared to the IMF may seem trivial, Grabel contends they should not be 
prematurely discounted, as Hirschman argued that the potential for substantive change is located 
‘in the disparate, unplanned, and the experimental’ (ibid.: 408). In claiming that the order has 
decentralized, Grabel channels Hirschman, arguing that scholars should not be concerned with the 
scalability or universalizability of RFAs, nor their significance with respect to the future of the 
global governance order. 
 
A different take on the impact of RFAs as challengers is more concerned about the implications of 
the emerging architecture on global governance. Volz (2016) finds that the current financial 
governance architecture is decentralized, fragmented, and lacks coordination with the IMF. He 
argues that this could threaten the stability of the financial architecture. Although the emerging 
RFAs do not represent a material threat that could displace the role of the Bretton Woods Order, 
they could potentially destabilize the order. In contrast to the functional supplementalists, Volz 
sees this challenge not as a practical coordination problem but as a justification for ‘substantial 
governance reform of the IMF’ (Volz, 2016: 2221). Thus, while Grabel sees the ‘potential’ that 
RFAs could lead to a more equitable global governance model and Barrowclough (2017) shares 
this optimism, Volz (2016) makes clear the urgency of considering the systemic implications of 
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the current financial landscape. There has been considerable progress in this respect, as seen in the 
IMF’s Policy Paper on RFAs (2017) and ongoing discussions between the IMF and major RFAs 
(including FLAR, CMIM, and European Stability Mechanism) to ensure effective communication 
and cooperation. Nonetheless, both functionalist and challenger accounts overlook the particular 
ways in which liquidity funds can challenge or threaten the coherence and stability of the system 
writ large, either intentionally or unintentionally. 
 
 
INSTITUTIONAL DESIGN AND THE NESTING OF RFAs 
 
While both top-down, systemic approaches and bottom-up, country-level approaches are useful 
for thinking about the state of the global governance system or the desires of certain states in the 
system, neither approach accounts for the actual mechanisms by which RFAs may affect global 
governance. RFAs are not just pluralist decision-making venues that reflect members’ preferences, 
they are institutions. We contend that this fundamental fact calls for a ‘middle-up’ approach that 
focuses on how RFAs’ institutional characteristics affect their relationship with the IMF. In this 
section, we build upon the rational design framework and Aggarwal’s (1998) concept of 
institutional nesting to assess RFAs and their implications for the global system of financial 
governance. 
 
The RDI framework contends that in creating institutions, states face a number of common 
challenges over enforcement, distribution, the number of actors and asymmetry, and uncertainty 
about behaviour, the state of the world and the preferences of others (Barnett and Finnemore, 1999; 
Koremenos, Lipson and Snidal, 2001). To overcome such problems, institutions are designed in 
various ways with respect to membership, scope, centralization, control and flexibility. While 
recognizing that actual design is often driven by political compromises, we use the rational design 
framework to understand how RFAs operate as organizations.  
 
Both top-down and bottom-up analyses of RFAs have recognized the importance of institutional 
design. Some have focused on membership and related patterns of inclusion or exclusion 
(Hamanaka, 2009; Lee, 2008). Others have evaluated the scope of various RFA instruments and 
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assessed the governance structures of RFAs (Grabel, 2018; Ocampo and Titelman, 2012; 
Titeleman et al., 2014). However, these accounts are vulnerable to one of the major drawbacks of 
the RDI approach — i.e., that its focus on internal dynamics downplays the importance of the 
broader regime or institutional landscape (Copelovitch and Putnam, 2014). Regional economic 
institutions are situated within a broader regime of global economic governance and are designed 
to interact with the existing order and change over time, as the actors who create these regimes 
‘must decide on how the institutions they adapt or create will be reconciled with existing 
arrangements — that is, through nesting or by parallel connections’ (Aggarwal, 1998: 5). RFAs, 
which are in large part designed to perform similar functions to the IMF, have been designed and 
modified over time to work within the IMF-led global crisis management regime. 
 
Work by Aggarwal (1998) provides a lens for analysing how new or adapted institutions will have 
either a nested or parallel connection to existing institutions. He defines nested institutions as 
institutions that are created to conform with a broader international regime hierarchy or issue area, 
while parallel institutions ‘deal with separate but related activities, as exemplified by the GATT 
and Bretton Woods monetary system’ (Aggarwal, 1998: 6). Parallel institutions are not nested and 
hence the institutions would serve similar yet distinct functions in parallel. Further, whether nested 
or parallel, institutions or issues can be either substantively or tactically linked. While Aggarwal’s 
framework is useful for assessing the nature of institutional linkages, his model for how linkages 
can shift among nesting, parallel and competing tends to conflate actor intent/preferences and 
perception of targeted institutions. It also does not sufficiently account for differences in size or 
capabilities.  
 
Thus, we employ a two-step approach to the study of institutional nesting. We advocate that the 
study of RFAs and their potential impacts begins at the institutional level with an analysis of the 
design of RFAs that focuses on features that may impact the institution’s nesting within the broader 
global financial order. Then, drawing on this institutional analysis, we assess the nature of the 
linkage across two dimensions: content and permanence. 
 
1. Content: The RDI framework provides a roadmap to assess both RFAs and the nature of 
their nested linkages with the broader institutional context. We characterize the content as 
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either ‘substantive’ or ‘nominal’. We define a substantive linkage as one that commits the 
RFA to coordinate with the IMF on one or more core functions. In contrast, we define a 
nominal link either as a statement of intention on a core function or a substantive 
commitment that only extends to non-core functions. 
 
2. Permanence: Permanence of a nested linkage can be defined as either ‘institutionalized’ or 
‘temporary-tactical’. An institutionalized link is formally identified in the source 
institution’s founding documents or operational plans. A temporary-tactical linkage is 
typically a commitment that is either not formally memorialized, is at odds with other formal 
declarations, or is explicitly limited in duration. 
 
Drawing together the insights of RDI and nesting allows us to identify the design features of RFAs 
that most directly define its relationship with the IMF. Based on our analysis of the content and 
permanence of the nested linkages, we can look beyond designed relationships to consider the 
potential design features that could facilitate an RFA ‘leaving the nest’, whether intentionally or 
unintentionally. It is also important to bear in mind that the content and permanence of linkages 
are not static, but rather can change over time. One benefit of using RDI to analyze institutions 
and institutional capacity is the insight it provides into the design mechanisms that permit change 
within and between institutions, thus providing clearer microfoundations than Aggarwal’s original 
model of assessing the potential for linkages to shift among nested, parallel, and competing. Our 
analysis of RFAs thus offers new insight into the (in)stability of the nested financial architecture. 
 
 
EMPIRICAL CASES 
 
In this section, we apply the RDI framework to unpack the cases of FLAR and the CMIM. We 
focus on these two RFAs for two reasons. First, they are the most institutionalized RFAs outside 
of the special case of the Eurozone. Second, they differ significantly from one another, offering 
crucial variation to our study. In the following section, we identify the design features that provide 
opportunities for institutions to ‘leave the nest’, how they define linkages and the implications for 
the stability of the global financial order. 
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Latin American Reserve Fund 
 
The Latin American Reserve Fund (FLAR) is a regional liquidity facility that provides balance of 
payment and liquidity support to member countries. It ‘acts largely as a credit cooperative’ (Grabel, 
2013: 9) by providing loans to members as a proportion of their capital contributions. As of July 
2017, FLAR’s paid-in capital totals US$ 2.85 billion and its lending capacity is US$ 4.8 billion.1 
Historically, in decreasing order of usage, member countries have received loans for balance of 
payments support, liquidity credits, contingency financing credit lines, and central bank external 
public debt restructuring. Despite the relatively small size of FLAR’s capitalization as compared 
to other liquidity funds, the FLAR has lent more to its member countries than the IMF for much 
of its history. Most notably, the FLAR has significantly outlent the IMF to FLAR member 
countries since 1998, with FLAR disbursements totaling US$ 4.47 billion as opposed to just US$ 
660.26 million in IMF disbursements, as of December 2017.2 
  
 
Membership 
 
The FLAR was first introduced as the Andean Reserve Fund (FAR) in 1978, with an initial 
membership limited to the Andean countries of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela. 
(Rosero, 2014) In 1989, the FAR was converted into a regional initiative and expanded in principle 
to all of Latin America. It was conceived of as an important component of regional integration and 
an important step towards building a more diversified and financially sound membership base.3 
However, the expansion of FAR to FLAR has only resulted in three additional members: Costa 
Rica (1999), Uruguay (2009) and Paraguay (2015). 
 
                                               
1 See FLAR Presentation Handbook, April 2017. 
2 These calculations do not include the IMF FCL, as Colombia, the only FLAR member country that has 
qualified for an FCL, has never drawn on the credit line. 
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In light of slow membership expansion after the FAR was expanded to be the FLAR, some member 
countries and FLAR leadership have advocated for a more diverse and expanded membership base 
that would include larger countries as members, such as Mexico or Brazil. While this could 
dramatically increase the FLAR’s capital, it would also have implications for the solidarity among 
FLAR members (Ocampo and Titelman, 2012; Perry, 2015. Despite the fact that, Colombia’s 
economy, FLAR’s largest member, is US$ 747 billion GDP (PPP) and nearly 10 times larger than 
its smallest member’s economy, the solidarity between members is deeply embedded in the 
Andean identity and integration initiative that led to the creation of FAR. At a minimum, the 
addition of a larger member from outside the Andean region would have implications for the 
dynamics of governance. Changes, such as a more complex voting structure, would likely be 
needed to entice new members (Titelman et al, 2014: 8). 
 
 
Scope 
 
The FLAR was designed primarily to provide balance-of-payments support, liquidity loans and 
other debt restructuring to member countries. But the scope of the institution also includes helping 
member countries to improve the investment conditions of foreign exchange reserves by providing 
guidance on how ‘to manage the reserve portfolios of member countries and other public sector 
institutions’ (Ocampo, 2015: 160). The third objective of the FLAR — to facilitate harmonization 
of the exchange, monetary and financial policies of member countries — has been marginal in 
practice, but it nevertheless facilitates dialogue between policy makers of the member countries, 
allowing them to share their respective experiences and knowledge. The organization is tasked 
with executing three main objectives as articulated in Chapter 1 of its Constitutive Agreement:4 
To provide support to member countries via credits, and guaranteeing third-party credits during 
balance-of-payments crises; to improve the investment conditions of international reserves of 
member countries; and to facilitate harmonization of the exchange, monetary and financial policies 
of member countries.  
 
 
                                               
4 http://flar.net/creacion-y-evolucion/ 
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Centralization 
 
Operationally, a number of tasks are performed by a centralized focal office, the FLAR 
headquarters in Bogotá, Colombia. FLAR has a General Secretariat and a number of divisions, 
such as Economic Studies, responsible for monitoring the economic situations of member 
countries and collecting economic data, and tracking key data on loans and member country 
repayments; Risk Management, Financial Management; and Administrative Management, which 
are all centrally organized in Colombia. Formal requests by members for loans from FLAR are 
submitted to the Executive President, who considers its justification and the modalities related to 
the instrument requested, term, disbursement, interest, amortization, and all other related technical 
and financial aspects of the requested package. The Executive President of the FLAR evaluates — 
in consultation with the requesting central bank — whether the economic and financial policies 
that the requesting member has adopted, or plans to adopt, are sufficient to provide the FLAR with 
reasonable assurance that the requested credit can be paid within the agreed term. For liquidity and 
contingency loans, the centralization of authority is absolute and the Executive President can 
approve the request for a loan. However, in instances of requests for balance of payment, the 
process is more decentralized. The Executive President prepares a confidential report for the Board 
of Directors, including the study, the credit request evaluation, and the Executive President’s 
opinion. The Board of Directors, comprised of the central bank governors of the member countries, 
considers the report and documents presented, as well as the proposed measures to address the 
issue, in a formal meeting. The Board of Directors then takes a formal vote. 
 
 
Control 
 
The governance structure that controls the FLAR is comprised of a Representative Assembly made 
up of the finance ministers from each member country, a Board of Directors including the central 
bank governors of each member country, and an Executive President. However, the FLAR differs 
from other prominent international institutions in the way in which it is controlled, or governed. 
First, each member country’s vote is weighted equally, regardless of financial contribution. This 
is also reflected in the Representative Assembly and Board of Directors, where each country has 
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one seat, thus one seat/one vote. As noted previously by Grimes and Kring (2018), this principle 
could be challenged should a larger regional economy such as Brazil or Mexico join the FLAR. 
FLAR strives for consensus in its decision making. In order for a proposal to be approved, a 
minimum of 75 per cent of the directors and governors must be present to deliberate and 75 per 
cent of those present must vote in favour of a decision to pass it. Certain decisions, such as 
modifying credit limits, altering the terms of the FLAR’s charter, or increasing capital, require a 
supermajority of 80 per cent of members. In contrast to the IMF, decision making in the FLAR is 
‘independent of capital contributions’ (Velarde, 2015: 149). 
 
 
Flexibility 
 
The FLAR is designed to ensure institutional flexibility, in terms of both transformative and 
adaptive change. For example, the Board of Directors is tasked, when necessary, with proposing 
special purpose funds ‘with resources contributed by one or more of the member countries, by 
third countries or by international negotiations’.5 Some adaptive changes, such as increasing the 
credit limits of member countries, fall on the shoulders of the Representative Assembly. Other 
adaptive change can be sought by the Board of Directors, as the Board has the right to appoint and 
remove the Executive President of the fund, and to ‘set forth the regulations needed to achieve the 
objectives of the Fund’.6  The Board is also charged with proposing capital increases to the 
Representative Assembly, but may not modify the constitutive agreement without approval by the 
Representative Assembly. According to Article 20 of the constitutive document of FLAR, key 
transformative powers are in the hands of the Representative Assembly. These include authorizing 
increases in the capital base of FLAR that have been proposed by the Board of Directors as well 
as approving amendments to the constitutive agreement itself. 
 
 
                                               
5 FLAR Constitutive Agreement (see p. 10). 
www.flar.net/uploads/default/projects/0e341bbcf9d8effc176f77a97cc53767.pdf 
6 FLAR Constitutive Agreement (see p. 14).  
www.flar.net/uploads/default/projects/0e341bbcf9d8effc176f77a97cc53767.pdf 
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Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization 
 
The Chiang Mai Initiative Multilateralization (CMIM) provides balance of payments support to 
its members in the form of both crisis management (Stability Facility, CMIM-SF) and preventive 
finance (Precautionary Line, CMIM-PL). Its predecessor, the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI) was set 
up as a network of bilateral swap agreements (BSAs); although CMIM explicitly emphasizes 
‘multilateralization’ as a core characteristic, the management and disbursal of funds continues to 
work through the BSA mechanism. However, governance, surveillance, and planning have been 
transformed from a set of agreements whose implementation was coordinated through informal 
norms of consensus to a clearly institutionalized set of processes with a formal international 
organization, the ASEAN+3 Macroeconomic Research Office (AMRO), supporting it. CMIM’s 
resources are significant, amounting nominally to US$ 240 billion. To date, CMIM’s swap-lines 
have never been invoked. However, the system is operational in other ways, including regional 
surveillance and contingency planning by AMRO.  
 
CMIM’s liquidity support regime is de facto nested under the IMF. Disbursal of funds is subject 
to the ‘IMF link’. Currently, members can draw at most 30 per cent of their borrowing maximums 
without IMF coordination, making effective use of CMIM contingent on IMF approval. As Grimes 
(2009, 2011) has argued, this reflects a conscious choice by the leading members, China and Japan, 
to delegate the unpleasant task of conditionality to an outside party, so as to minimize both moral 
hazard and direct political blowback. Other functions, such as surveillance and contingency 
planning, operate in parallel or in cooperation with the IMF. Still, there has been significant debate 
in the literature as to whether the current nested relationship might change to one that is parallel 
or even competing. (Grimes, 2006) 
 
 
Membership 
 
CMIM membership is coterminous with the ASEAN+3, a loose set of regional regimes that 
predated CMI and CMIM. The leading members in terms of size and initiative are Japan and China, 
which have made by far the largest financial commitments to the venture. As Fritz and Mühlich 
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(2014: 136) note, such asymmetry implies that the large participants ‘take on a benevolent policy 
stance towards the smaller member countries’. Half of the ASEAN members are very small and/or 
financially closed economies (such as Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar and Vietnam). In the 
middle lie those open economies that are most likely to avail themselves of CMIM help, including 
South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. Importantly, as has 
been widely noted, the United States is not a member; nor are potential cooperating partners in the 
greater region, such as Australia, India and New Zealand. 
 
 
Scope 
 
CMIM comprises four main functions: precautionary lending, crisis lending, surveillance and 
technical cooperation. To date, surveillance and technical cooperation are up and running through 
AMRO, although budgetary and personnel constraints limit their effectiveness. Precautionary 
lending and crisis lending have yet to be invoked. However, AMRO has been tasked with 
developing the capabilities to assess liquidity needs, design plans for liquidity assistance, and 
ensure that the disbursal of funds can be done quickly and decisively. To do so, AMRO has also 
been developing operational ties with essential cooperating partners, in particular the IMF (due to 
the IMF link) and the US Federal Reserve and New York Federal Reserve (to operationalize the 
dollar-denominated BSAs).  
 
 
Centralization 
 
CMIM is much less centralized that the FLAR. Rather than having a permanent board, decisions 
on all substantive matters are made by the finance ministers or vice-ministers of the member states. 
Also, unlike the FLAR’s centrally managed reserve fund, the CMIM liquidity pool is not an actual 
fund but rather a series of formal commitments to swap dollar reserves held by individual member 
states. The Multilateralization Agreement of 2009 created a limited degree of centralization in the 
system, by creating a single contract to govern BSAs and by creating a system of contributions 
and weighted voting. The establishment of AMRO in 2011 marked the first serious step toward 
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centralization. AMRO, which was chartered as an official international organization as of 2016, 
has a director and three main divisions that are organized to support the CMIM mission.7 AMRO 
is responsible for its own hiring, economic research and design of surveillance, and cooperation 
with external organizations. Its budget is decided and provided by the CMIM finance ministers, 
who also constitute its non-resident board of directors. 
 
 
Control 
 
CMIM has a simple internal governance structure. Most decisions are made on a consensus basis 
in meetings of the member states’ finance ministers or their representatives. Surveillance is done 
in the first instance by AMRO staff, then discussed among the finance ministers and their deputies, 
with no binding decisions or recommendations made. Since 2016, AMRO has begun publishing 
country reports on its website, although some members have opted not to have theirs made 
available. There is also a weighted voting system that is used only for decisions involving swap 
activation. There is no resident board, so non-urgent decisions are typically formalized in the 
biannual meetings of the finance ministers. Decisions involving swap activation are by definition 
urgent, so votes can be collected asynchronously by the serving chairs. 
 
AMRO is accountable, both in its administration and in its substantive activities, to the ASEAN+3 
principals, which provide its budget. If, or when, a request for funds is made, the members refer 
the case to AMRO to analyse and to design a plan (i.e., whether funds are to be disbursed, in what 
amounts, and with what conditions). The resulting plan is presented to the principals, who may 
accept, reject, or modify it subject to the two-thirds weighted vote requirement for disbursement. 
The external relationship with the IMF complicates this simple picture. It is difficult to imagine a 
contingency involving any of the open ASEAN+3 economies that could be adequately addressed 
through the release of delinked funds. This means that all decisions regarding disbursement 
involve coordination and consultation with the IMF, with IMF approval8 a necessary but not 
                                               
7 www.amro-asia.org/ 
8 What ‘approval’ means remains maddeningly under-defined, at least to external parties. The standard for 
crisis support appears to be that the crisis country is engaged ‘good faith bargaining’ with the IMF. As for 
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sufficient condition for moving forward a rescue or precautionary plan. There are also some 
important technical matters that could create complications at the operational level, including 
issues of funding duration, tranching and seniority. This has been identified as an issue by both the 
IMF and AMRO, and according to the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers’ communique (2018) and 
interviews with AMRO and IMF officials, it has been resolved in principle following the 
framework of the IMF policy paper on regional financial arrangements (IMF, 2017). 
 
 
Flexibility 
 
CMIM has proven to be quite flexible in terms of institutional evolution. It has expanded in size 
from a notional US$ 40 billion in 2000 to the current US$ 240 billion in three separate agreements. 
It has standardized its BSA contracts and then multilateralized its disbursement criteria. It has gone 
from ambiguously-defined, consensus-based decision making on disbursement to weighted voting. 
It created the CMIM-PL in response to the global financial crisis. And it has developed a dedicated 
international organization in the form of AMRO. There is no reason to expect that the member 
states will not further expand the pool, task AMRO with new functions, or further reduce the IMF 
link. (In fact, there is a standing proposal to increase the delinked funds from 30per cent to 40 per 
cent, although China’s Finance Ministry has so far been reticent to take that step.) In principal, the 
requirement of consensus for non-emergency decisions should slow down institutional evolution. 
In practice, it has reaffirmed the importance of the biggest members, Japan and China. As has been 
argued elsewhere Grimes (2009, 2011, 2015, these two countries are the ones putting their money 
most at risk, whereas others (especially ASEAN-4 and South Korea) are the most forward-leaning 
in terms of expanding resources, easing conditions and reducing the IMF link.  
 
It is unclear how flexibility may emerge in an urgent situation. AMRO does have a great deal of 
autonomy in devising its surveillance practices, deciding how to model a country’s situation, and 
creating rescue plans. The principals may accept, reject or modify those decisions, of course, but 
that only shifts the locus of flexibility up to the decision makers. The one major question is how 
                                               
precautionary lending, qualification for the IMF’s Precautionary and Liquidity Line is likely to be the 
trigger, although this is left ambiguous in the agreement text. 
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the CMIM process would manage a situation in which the preferences of the principals diverged 
from the judgment of the IMF. The possibilities range from negotiating at greater length with the 
IMF, deciding as a group to disregard or even jettison the IMF link and act as a parallel rather than 
nested entity, or for individual members to go it alone using either existing or newly-devised swap 
lines. 
 
 
THE NATURE OF NESTING 
 
Institutional design and nested linkages provide a picture not only of how institutions are designed 
to be a part of the nest, but also potential ways that RFAs could leave the nest. We argue that there 
are three potential pathways through which RFAs could leave: intentions of the principals, features 
of institutional design and implementation-driven divergence. The intentions of principals are 
determined at the state level and are thus outside this analysis. Instead we focus on the role that 
institutional design potentially plays in RFAs leaving the nest. We revisit the possibility of 
implementation-driven divergence, which is made possible by institutional design, in the 
conclusion. 
 
Drawing on the RDI framework and our analysis of the nested linkage between RFAs and the IMF, 
we find that certain design features create potential pathways out of the nest for RFAs. These 
include size, governance, institutional capacity and flexibility. The larger the RFA, the greater the 
institution’s capacity to ‘go it alone’ without the IMF and the broader context of global financial 
governance. Further, governance features such as voting weights, decision-making structure, and 
the nature of linkages to the institutional context provide opportunities for RFAs to sustain their 
operations upon leaving the nest. Relatedly, a robust capacity of programmatic functions, such as 
surveillance and economic studies, are also necessary for institutions to viably leave the nest.  
Yet despite ongoing speculation about delinking from the IMF-led regime, neither the FLAR nor 
CMIM is in a position to do so easily. Constraints in design, size, or capacity present serious 
challenges of viability outside of the nest. Nested linkages could further constrain the institution 
and CMIM at least seem to be tightening its operational cooperation with the IMF (ASEAN+3, 
2018; interviews). Thus, we must also carefully consider how the flexibility built into institutional 
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designs provides opportunities to change the governance structure, capacities, and linkages of the 
institution.  
 
 
Latin American Reserve Fund 
 
The FLAR is clearly capable of leaving the nest with respect to its capacity of credit facilities 
(scope) and the institution’s governance structure (control). Further, the underlying institutional 
design allows for fundamental changes to the institution as deemed necessary, including changes 
to paid-in capital and the charter itself, provided a three-quarter-vote threshold is reached. Finally, 
the FLAR’s linkage to the IMF-led global regime is tactical-temporary and nominal in nature.  
Despite the FLAR’s rhetoric to the effect that it is a supplement to the IMF, the only formal linkage 
the institution has to the IMF is an agreement to allow future small-sized members of the FLAR 
to count capital paid-into the FLAR as a portion of their international reserves. Further, FLAR 
members have also clearly revealed a preference for FLAR funding over IMF involvement — 
despite the fact that FLAR interest rates are higher than the IMF — as seen in their relative usage 
of FLAR vs IMF funding over the last two decades.9 Yet, despite the potential desirability of the 
institution’s high degree of institutional autonomy and limited/nominal degree of nesting, the 
institution is constrained by its size. To be sure, this constraint has not prevented the FLAR from 
leaving the nest, even if only for short flights. Since the 2007 Financial Crisis, FLAR has lent US$ 
2.74 billion to member countries, while the IMF has only issued one loan totaling US$ 364 million. 
The viability of the FLAR ‘outside of the nest’ is supported by the perfect repayment record by 
members over its 39-year history and its members’ revealed preferences for turning to it rather 
than to the IMF. In these respects, the FLAR is an exemplar of an RFA that may leave the nest, 
based on its tactical and mostly nominal embrace of the IMF as hierarchical superior. 
The application of the RDI framework to FLAR highlights that the key constraint on the institution 
leaving the nest is size. Despite the success of the FLAR in supporting smaller member states, an 
evaluation of its current level of capitalization reveals that it would be unlikely to meet the needs 
                                               
9 Both FLAR and IMF loans come with significantly lower interest rates than market rates, if the member 
country requesting a loan has access to capital markets at all.  
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of its larger members (Titelman, 2014). However, there are steps that could potentially be taken to 
dramatically increase the capitalization and resources of FLAR and thus its lending capacity; 
membership could grow to include larger regional members or paid-in capital could be leveraged 
to borrow from international markets. In fact, FLAR, which maintains a region’s best credit rating 
of AA, previously ‘issued bonds on two occasions: a three-year bond for US$ 150 million in 2003 
and a five-year bond for US$ 250 [million] in 2006’ (Ocampo and Titelman, 2012:  19). 
Membership expansion remains controversial within the FLAR, however. More conservative 
member states, such as Colombia, argue that the institution needs more resources and that such 
resources should be secured through increases in paid-in capital from existing and new members, 
especially larger regional powers such as Mexico and Brazil. However, interviews with other 
member countries’ central banks officials, such as in Ecuador and Venezuela, revealed that some 
FLAR members want the institution to leverage its AA credit rating to raise additional financial 
resources. Grimes and Kring (2018) demonstrate that an infrequently used facility, known as the 
peso andino, is another mechanism that could be used to expand the FLAR’s lendable resources. 
Hence, there are a number of ways in which FLAR could overcome resource constraints to leave 
the nest in the future if the members so choose. 
 
 
CMIM 
 
CMIM offers a contrast to the FLAR. It has the size and scope to leave the nest (albeit probably 
not the organizational capacity at this point), but its role as subordinate to the IMF is written into 
its founding documents in the form of the IMF link. The IMF link is not only institutionalized, but 
is also extremely substantive, affecting CMIM’s core functions directly. As Grimes (2009, 2011) 
has argued, it also clearly serves the interests of its largest members to delegate conditionality to 
the IMF. Still, the design of CMIM allows for large scale, perhaps even rapid changes in the nesting 
relationship. Despite the consensus rule for institutional changes, the design, governance, and 
institutional capacity of CMIM have changed dramatically over time. This includes all of the 
characteristics that define its relationship with the IMF, from size to scope (CMIM-PL) to 
governance to creation of AMRO to the gradual reduction of the IMF link. 
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All of these design features are consequential in terms of increasing CMIM’s ability to fulfill its 
mission of preventing and managing regional currency crises. However, all of them also create 
new openings for leaving the IMF nest, whether intentionally or unintentionally. They do so by 
creating capacities and practices that parallel those of the IMF — and to be more specific, the 
capacities and practices that have been presented over time by ASEAN+3 policy makers and 
scholars as the essential functions that justified the establishment and maintenance of the IMF link 
in the first place. This is significant. Aggarwal’s (1998) typology appropriately draws an explicit 
distinction between institutions that are nested within a regime versus those that are parallel versus 
those that are competing. Over time, CMIM has taken on more and more capabilities and features 
that parallel those of the IMF (in particular, AMRO and CMIM-PL) rather than being simply 
complementary. For the moment, the IMF link — as well as the preferences of the leading 
countries, Japan and China — ties CMIM to the IMF both substantively and institutionally. 
However, the shift toward being a parallel institution in many aspects of CMIM’s design opens a 
clear path to leaving the nest, should Japan and China choose to do so in response to either regional 
or global dynamics. 
 
While our focus has been on the relationship between RFAs and the IMF, we should also note a 
further wrinkle in the East Asia case: the parallel existence of large, non-CMIM BSAs between 
Japan and/or China on the one hand and potentially vulnerable CMIM partners on the other (see 
Table 1, as well as Grimes, 2015.) Some of these are very large (e.g. the Japan-Indonesia BSA is 
equal to Indonesia’s CMIM borrowing maximum) and their connection to the CMIM-IMF regime 
is informal and undeclared. While Japanese officials state that their non-CMIM BSAs are nested 
within the CMIM regime, the Chinese BSAs are not. Even the Japanese BSAs raise the possibility 
of leaving the nest in an emergency without formally changing the CMIM agreement — either by 
unilaterally activating them without IMF agreement (thus de facto delinking them) or by disbursing 
them to supplement activation of IMF-delinked CMIM swaps. If either were to happen, it would 
leave the nature of future cooperation with the IMF in question, as a matter to be negotiated 
between two parallel, no longer nested, organizations.  
 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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CONCLUSION 
 
In this article, we have sought to contribute to the debate on how to understand the role of regional 
cooperation in the international financial architecture. We focus on the relationship between RFAs 
and the IMF, an issue that is becoming of increasing importance as the number and scale of RFAs 
continues to expand. We acknowledge that this is a moving target, as both the IMF and RFAs work 
to adjust to the rapidly evolving reality. However, much of the work that is being done in that 
space is on operational matters. We contend that institutional features are more important for 
understanding how RFAs relate to the IMF and define the GFSN.  
 
In some cases, such as CMIM, regional funds are likely to exceed IMF funds in the event of a 
currency crisis in a member economy. Already, the FLAR lends more to member states facing 
balance of payments difficulties than does the IMF. How the actions of RFAs will affect both 
economies in crisis and the functioning of the IMF itself remain in question. The issue is also of 
academic interest, as evidenced by a growing debate over how RFAs relate to global governance. 
We are interested in exploring further the effects of RFAs on the contours and behavior of the 
system, but we argue that such an analysis is impossible without a serious, theory-based analysis 
of the nature and viability of the links between RFAs and global governance. Such an analysis has 
been our goal in this article. 
  
We build our analysis from the observation that RFAs are organizations that were designed and 
established by their members for the specific, important, and often urgent mission of balance of 
payment support. As organizations, their behavior and functions cannot be derived just from their 
stated missions or from the preferences of their members. To understand how they operate, both 
in normal and in crisis times, it is essential to understand them as organizations whose capabilities 
are constituted and constrained by their internal design and external relationships. Internally, we 
rely on the RDI literature to identify those aspects of design that are likely to have the greatest 
impact on their behavior. Externally, we observe that many if not all RFAs are nested (whether 
formally or de facto) in the IMF-led global regime, but that the dimensions and strength of that 
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nesting can vary significantly. We combine the insights of the RDI and nesting paradigms to 
identify whether and where there are institutional attributes that raise the likelihood of decoupling 
from the global regime, or ‘leaving the nest’. 
  
The institutional designs of both the FLAR and CMIM contain within them the potential for 
decoupling, but the particulars — and the likely pathways of decoupling — differ considerably. 
Our analysis highlights the relevance of developing the capacity to perform core functions that 
parallel, rather than defer to, those of the IMF. The FLAR in particular has gone very far down the 
road toward creating an institution that parallels the IMF. Already, we see that the FLAR has 
partially decoupled in terms of its lending activity, although its lack of resources has kept it from 
taking more than short flights from the nest. Meanwhile, CMIM remains firmly within the nest in 
terms of decision making on activation of BSAs, but its continuing expansion of resources, as well 
as the development of new facilities and institutional capacities that self-consciously parallel those 
of the IMF, creates fissures in the nesting relationship that could open widely under the right (or 
wrong?) circumstances. 
  
Under what circumstances can these internal, institutional, design elements be activated in such a 
way as to sever the hierarchical bonds between RFAs and the IMF? We suggest three likely 
possibilities. The first, which relates to the design and redesign of the institutions, arises from the 
preferences of the member states. In CMIM, for example, there has been a gap between the 
enthusiasm of ASEAN states and South Korea for greater decoupling from the IMF and the more 
cautious approach of Japan and China, which are the primary underwriters of regional liquidity 
support. That might change, in which case the nested relationship between CMIM and the IMF 
would likely change as well. 
  
Of greater interest to our project are the potential ruptures that derive from institutional 
characteristics. One possibility, which has previously been raised regarding CMIM (Grimes, 2011, 
2015), is that ongoing functional enhancements to make a given RFA more able to prevent or 
manage crises (e.g., increasing size, expanding instruments, improving surveillance) will over time 
make the RFA into a de facto parallel institution, regardless of whether the founding documents 
stipulate a nested relationship. For some RFAs, that might make a reliance on the IMF superfluous. 
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Arguably, this has already happened for the FLAR, at least for some functions; there is a real 
possibility that it will occur in the case of the CMIM, if current trends persist. 
  
Finally, and perhaps most likely in the case of the CMIM, is the possibility that a rupture will be 
triggered not by the members but by the actions of the IMF. This is certainly an outcome that IMF 
officials are working to avoid, although even its apparent accommodations to RFAs assume a 
superior hierarchical role. At the moment, CMIM is probably not well enough developed for its 
leading members to want to leave the relative warmth and stability of the IMF nest. However, if 
there is a clash between the decisions of CMIM and the IMF in the event of a crisis, CMIM is 
sufficiently large and well-developed to justify breaking loose in order to contain the regional 
economic damage. In recent years, this possibility has looked less likely, as the approaches of the 
CMIM and IMF to balance of payments crises have tended to converge. But that is by no means 
guaranteed, especially after the U.S. presidential election of 2016. Looking at President Trump’s 
skepticism of international organizations as well as the anti-bailout ideology of political appointees 
in the US Treasury, East Asian policy makers must seriously consider the possibility that the U.S. 
will seek to derail an IMF-led plan to help a CMIM member in or facing crisis. While decoupling 
might still be premature in an institutional sense, the prospects of a regional crisis could prompt 
CMIM members to decide that it is time to leave the nest, with potentially enormous impacts on 
the global financial architecture.  
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